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Abstract—The increase in computational power and available
data has fueled a wide deployment of deep learning in production
environments. Despite their successes, deep architectures are still
poorly understood and costly to train. We demonstrate in this
paper how a simple recipe enables a market player to harm or
delay the development of a competing product. Such a threat
model is novel and has not been considered so far. We derive
the corresponding attacks and show their efficacy both formally
and empirically. These attacks only require access to the initial,
untrained weights of a network. No knowledge of the problem
domain and the data used by the victim is needed. On the initial
weights, a mere permutation is sufficient to limit the achieved
accuracy to for example 50% on the MNIST dataset or double
the needed training time. While we can show straightforward
ways to mitigate the attacks, the respective steps are not part of
the standard procedure taken by developers so far.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning is ubiquitous, and nowadays used by many
companies in production environments. The usage ranges from
computer vision [13] over autonomous driving, natural lan-
guage processing [23] and Malware detection [32] to health-
care [25]. Many of these applications are fueled by large
amounts of collected data used to train such deep models.
While the performance of deep learning systems is impres-
sive, reaching state-of-the-art results requires extensive tuning
of hyper-parameters that is quite costly in terms of resources
and time. The impact of design decisions is often understood
poorly or only on a heuristic level. In particular for new
problem domains and datasets, it is not clear which perfor-
mance can be reached given a certain architecture and which
architecture will perform best. In addition to that, reasonable
development and computation times can only be reached by
utilizing highly optimized dedicated libraries and frameworks.
This code is typically used off-the-shelf, as inspection is too
costly.
This environment opens up new opportunities for mali-
ciously interfering with the machine learning pipeline (visu-
alized in fig. 1). We present a novel attack vector on deep
learning called adversarial initialization that can be used for
deteriorating the achieved performance in a stealthy way. The
basic idea is to alter the underlying deep learning library
so that it produces results that appear to be sound but are
actually much worse, independent of the data considered.
∗First two authors contributed equally. Please contact:
kathrin.grosse@cispa.saarland.
More concretely, the attacker changes the initialization routine
that outputs the initial weights which are then trained by the
victim. Our attack is independent of the data the model is
afterwards trained on and does not require control of the
system beyond the initialization before training. We propose
a permutation based approach as an example for this kind of
interference. Yet, more subtle attacks are imaginable.
As an illustration, consider a company that decides to apply
deep learning to overcome some challenge. At the same time,
the attacker manages to exchange the deep learning library
in the company’s system with the maliciously altered one.
If the system had been perturbed in a too aggressive way,
the developers would quickly get suspicious and question its
integrity. With a controlled deterioration of performance as it
is offered by our approach, they are instead likely to believe
that the problem is harder to solve than expected. This may
thus result in longer development times, inferior products or
even an abandoning of the overall project if it appears too
expensive to tackle.
In order to underline the novelty of our approach, we briefly
contrast it with existing attacks on deep learning. Figure 1
shows known attacks on the machine learning pipeline. These
take place at test time or require manipulation of the training
data. Our attack, however, takes place after the network has
been designed by the victim and before it is trained. Contrary
to training-time or poisoning attacks [21], [33] adversarial
initialization is completely data agnostic.
More specifically, our contributions are as follows:
• We uncover a novel attack vector on deep learning
models, called adversarial initialization. We describe the
corresponding threat model.
• On this basis, we present three instances of attacks.
They downscale the capacity of the DNN compared to
a model of the same architecture which is initialized in
an unmanipulated, usual way.
• We evaluate the previously described attacks on a variety
of architectures and datasets. This includes tiny networks
on datasets with as few as 12 features as well as large
convolutional architectures on the CIFAR10 dataset. As
expected, all of them are vulnerable to our attacks. On
MNIST, Fashion-MIST and CIFAR10, the best achievable
accuracy under attack is around 50%. On smaller datasets,
we are able to increase the training time between a factor
of 2 and 10. Despite these changes, statistics such as mean
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
03
02
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 Fe
b 2
01
9
data
design
training
model
application
poisoning [21], [33] model stealing [38]
model reverse engineering [27]
membership inference [34]
evasion
[6], [37]
adversarial initialization (ours)
Fig. 1: Different modes of attacks on the machine learning pipeline. Each arrow stands for one possible attack and points from
what is controlled to what is attacked.
and variance of the weights and loss still look normal
during training.
• We explain how the specific attacks proposed in this paper
can be mitigated when training a model: Simply plotting
the weights or visualizing learned filters for convolutional
networks suffices to detect the attacks. Once detected, the
attack can be undone by shuffling the weights.
II. A NEW THREAT MODEL
In this section, we present the attacker model of adversarial
initialization which targets deep learning models. We describe
both capabilities and knowledge of both attacker Eve and
victim Alice.
Victim. Assume user Alice wants to train a deep neural
network (DNN) on some classification task. She collects a
set of examples for that task, which she divides into training
and test data1. Alice evaluates her system by measuring the
accuracy a, the percentage of the test cases the network
predicts correctly. The DNN is iteratively optimized on the
training data. The number of training epochs t (that translate
into iterations, depending on the optimizer) is a measure of the
time it takes for the network to achieve the best accuracy a.
For a new task, Alice has no good estimate of what accuracy
a and training time t she can expect. As a consequence, Alice
monitors relevant statistics during training of her DNN. These
training statistics include the mean and variance of the weights
as well as the loss during training. She will become suspicious
and search for the source of failures if the network exhibits
unusual behavior. This includes but is not limited to exploding
gradients and zero gradients, and hence includes that training
fails completely. If her network trains, but does not converge
to a very high accuracy, Alice might be tricked into believing
that there is no sufficient data or the network is not expressive
enough.
1Strictly speaking validation data because the true test data is unknown.
Attacker. Eve’s goal is to harm the performance of Alice’s
DNN without destroying her confidence in it. This might mean
to aim for either one or all of the following goals:
a) Increase the time an individual model needs until conver-
gence, e.g. tattack  tbenign.
b) Decrease the accuracy that is achieved by an individual
DNN, e.g. aattack  abenign. To not raise suspicions, aattack
should be larger than random guess accuracy.
Attacker’s capabilities. We assume that Eve is able to alter
the DNN library used by Alice. Eve might for example
a) abuse a security breach and replace the library on Alice’s
computer.
b) publish a tampered precompiled library online.2
Eve can arbitrarily alter the library she targets. However, she
has no influence on how Alice uses this library.
Attacker’s Knowledge. Eve has no knowledge about the
task Alice wants to solve. This extends in particular to the
dataset Alice trains on. However, Eve can use all the infor-
mation made available to her through the library’s interface.
Eve is for example able to observe Alice’s design choices
concerning the network such as size of the individual layers,
whether she uses convolutions, or the chosen learning rate.
III. RELATED WORK
Recently, the security of machine learning (ML) has
received attention from both the security and the ML
community[3]. We give an overview of attack vectors in
fig. 1. The most related attack to our work is poisoning.
The corresponding attacker alters the training data to harm or
manipulate the resulting classifier to its wishes. These attacks
have been studied for context anomaly detectors [31], support
vector machines [24], [2] and DNNs [21], [33]. Recent works
on DNN implant back-doors [33]: a particular input pattern
2In deep learning, software packages evolve rapidly, leading to the usage
of unofficial versions of libraries.
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Fig. 2: Sketch of a fully connected feed-forward neural net-
work with two hidden layers for illustrating the notation.
that always triggers the same classification output. Poisoning
attacks are however not to be confused with our attacker that
alters the initial classifier and has no knowledge about the
training data.
Furthermore, Cheney et al. [5] and Liu et al. [22] investigate
dropping or altering weights at test time. We, instead, focus
on altering the weights before training.
Additionally and independently from our work, the security
of deep learning frameworks has been investigated. This
includes security relevant bugs in ML frameworks [35], as
opposed to our active attacker. Active attackers in such frame-
works have been studied, however. Xiao et al. [40] investigate
an active attacker that manipulates the image that is passed to
the networks at test time. The same authors [41] investigate
in how far the loading of the model can be manipulated by
an adversary. Further, they investigate an attacker who alters
the images fed into the model at training time. Again, our
attacker manipulates the initial model, and does not assume
any knowledge about the training data.
Last but not least, Park et al. [28] introduce adversarial
dropout. This dropout is configured to use labels to prevent
overfitting, and does not relate to an adversary that manipulates
training with a malicious intent.
IV. BACKGROUND
In this work, we focus on deep neural networks (DNN)
trained to perform classification. Such systems are adapted
to a specific task by means of supervised learning: Given
training data in the form of a (usually large) set of input
feature vectors Xi and corresponding labels Yi, the network
approximates the underlying unknown distribution. If this
procedure is successful, the DNN is then able to correctly
classify most instances of unseen test data that is drawn from
a similar distribution as the training data. Before we detail the
learning procedure, we focus on the structure of the DNN (a
small toy network is illustrated in fig. 2).
DNN Architectures. DNNs are parametrized models which
are organized in layers. Each layer consists of li neurons,
which are parametrized using weights Wi and biases bi and
filter
Fig. 3: Application of a filter in a convolutional neural net-
work. The 3×3 filter “slides” over all elements of the input and
produces the corresponding output component as the weighted
sum of the nine input values. The dotted cells indicate padding
that is necessary for handling the values at the fringes. For
clarity, the sources of only four components are shown.
are equipped with an activation function fi to introduce non-
linearity. This activation function is per de facto standard
ReLU(z) := max(0, z). Summing up, the layer can be
formalized as xi = fi(Wixi−1+bi), where xi−1 is the output
of the previous layer and xi is fed into the next layer. x0 is
the input feature vector that is to be classified. The activation
function of the last layer is usually a normalizing softmax
function that creates a proper probability distribution over the
possible output classes.
Such a fully connected layout hinges on the assumption that
all features are independent. In some settings such as vision,
it does not matter where a combination of features occurs
(e.g. a cat in the lower or upper half is still a cat). Such
properties are expressible in DNNs by using convolutional
layers that apply convolution using learned filters. Each filter is
represented as a small matrix, where each layer is represented
as a collection of such learnable filters. The filters slide over
the image to produce the output for the consecutive layer (cf.
fig. 3). Following convolutional layers, ReLU activations are
applied, often followed by max-pooling layers. A max-pooling
layer outputs the maximum value inside a specific frame, or
sub-samples a layer. Pooling layers are generally not altered
in training.
DNN Training. Given the enormous amounts of adaptable
parameters and the deep structure, DNNs are very expressive
and can theoretically model arbitrary distributions [4]. While
this is certainly a strength, it also makes learning the param-
eters a critical and hard task.
Training is done by adjusting the outputs Y ′ of the network
for the inputs Xi so that they match the training labels Yi.
In order to do that, the standard method is to update the
weights Wi and biases bi incrementally using the back-
propagation algorithm. This algorithm works by propagating
the error backwards through the network using the chain rule.
The resulting weight updates are in practice computed using
stochastic gradient descent, in general with bias correction,
then called Adam optimizer.
DNN involve tuning of many hyper-parameters. One of
these is the learning rate that determines how much the
weights may change during a single update. This rate must
be neither too small nor too large for efficient convergence.
Other hyper-parameters are the specific layout of the network
and for example the usage of dropout [14]. Dropout prevents
co-adaptation of features by dropping (i.e. setting to zero)
each connection between to neurons with a pre-set probability,
during each round in training.
DNN Initialization. The learning procedure that was just
described is based on incremental updates of the parameters
of the network. This means that the initial parameters must
be chosen in a good way. While such a choice is obviously
important for the success of the training, the initialization of
neural networks is still an open research field in machine
learning. In practice, initialization is usually based on some
heuristics that are grounded in some general observations:
• The initialization must break symmetries of the network.
This means weights must be varied and independent. As a
counter-example, take a network with constant weights.
All neurons in one layer are then computing the same
function and are thus redundant. This makes random
initializations popular.
• Vanishing or exploding gradients deteriorate the perfor-
mance of the models or even stop respectively crash the
training [1], [29]. In particular for very deep networks, too
large or too small initial weights produce large or small
products that lead to these phenomena and hinder the
errors from propagating through the network. Because of
that, larger layers generally require smaller weights [12].
• Initialization has an effect due to the gradients it creates.
Furthermore, ReLU activation functions with their either
zero or one gradient are less problematic than e.g. sig-
moid activations that can saturate [10], [36], leading to
vanishing gradients.
• For initialization, the weight matrices are more important
than the biases due to their larger impact on the gradient.
These insights have led to a variety of recipes for initializing
DNNs. Before DNNs gained the popularity they have today,
rather complex methods for obtaining good initializations were
discussed, e.g. [8], [7], [42] among many others. More modern
alternative ideas are for example layer-sequential initializa-
tions [26].
State of the art approaches rely on the idea that given a
random initialization, the variance of weights is particularly
important [11], [12] and determines the dynamics of the
networks [16], [30]. In accordance with this, weights are
nowadays usually simply drawn from some zero-centered (and
maybe cut-off) Gaussian distribution with appropriate variance
[9], while the biases are often set to a constant. Besides the
so called Xavier or Glorot initialization [10], in particular the
He initialization is utilized [13]. For the experiments in this
work, we will use the latter and choose weights from a zero-
mean Gaussian with variance
√
2
li
. For convolutional networks
the bias is set to zero, while it is 0.1 for the fully connected
architectures.
V. FORMALIZATION AND THEORY
Before we start detailing our attacks, we want to briefly
present several alternative candidates for spoiling the training
of DNNs given our threat model. Here, our objective is to
contrast our approach with less suitable ones. As we have
seen in the previous section, the initial weights, biases, and
also the learning rate influence weight updates and thereby
convergence. We list here a range of potential attacks and their
drawbacks3.
Shrink/expand weights. As stated in the previous sec-
tion, vanishing or exploding gradients can be triggered by
disproportional weight sizes. A simple way of impairing the
success of training is thus to shrink or expand the existing
weights. These changes, however, will quickly be discovered
when basic statistics of either the weights or the gradients are
inspected.
Architecture. As Eve controls the learning framework, she
could easily initialize smaller weight matrices than intended,
thereby re-scaling the network while other hyper-parameters
look normal. Yet, a superficial check of the configuration will
directly expose the attack, when Alice for example stores or
inspects a model.
Learning rate. An example of an attack via changing the
hyper-parameters is the redefinition of the learning rate set
by Alice. It can be made smaller so that the learning is
delayed. Yet, the learning rate is a feature that has to be chosen
appropriately, so it is likely to be detected during the evaluation
of hyper-parameters when fixed or to be canceled out when
set dynamically.
Dropout. Similar to the previous attack, Eve can alter the
dropout rate set by Alice. Eve’s goal is to set a dropout rate so
high that the network is too unstable during training to yield a
well working classifier. As with the learning rate, however, a
dynamic change of dropout can be circumvented and a static
change is likely to be detected. Also, dropout is not necessary
to train a network—training a network without dropout then
gives away the attacker or simply renders the attack useless.
Physical attacks. Of course, the goal of harming technical
developments can also be reached by physical attacks on
hardware and infrastructure, e.g. by destroying equipment or
under-clocking CPUs or GPUs, but again these attacks are
typically easy to detect and require a level of access that goes
beyond the placement of a malicious software library.
The previous paragraphs underline that while it is straight-
forward to deteriorate the performance of a network or the
training success given our threat model, most attacks are quite
easy to detect or circumvent because they alter quantities that
are regularly directly controlled by the user. On this basis and
taking practical considerations into account, we instantiate the
attacker used in this paper.
Attacker’s capabilities. Eve altered the initialization rou-
tines in the library. She can arbitrarily change the weights. To
3An evaluation of some these attacks can be found in the Appendix.
remain stealthy, she commits to the constraint that principal
statistics (mean, variance, shape) of the weights are preserved.
Attacker’s knowledge. Eve remains oblivious on the task
Alice wants to solve. She has access only to the shapes of the
weight matrices that form Alice’s network. She obtains these
matrices in order of initialization or occurrence in the network.
Having specified the goals and attacker, we now detail how
to mount a corresponding attack by permuting the weights.
A. Prototype of our Attacks
Before we discuss specifics and the generalization of our
attacks, we motivate our approach by discussing its most
basic version. Consider the following equation that represents
two consecutive layers in a fully connected feed-forward
network with weight matrices A ∈ Rm×n and B ∈ R`×m,
corresponding biases a ∈ Rm as well as b ∈ R`, and ReLU
activation functions:
y = ReLU
(
BReLU(Ax+ a) + b
)
(1)
This structure respectively similar structures (like two con-
secutive convolutional layers) that are also vulnerable to our
attack can be found in a plethora of typical DNN architec-
tures. We assume that the neurons are represented as column
vectors4.
Now, the idea behind our attack is to permute the compo-
nents of A and B after they have been initialized randomly in
the normal way, with the goal that many of the components
of the output y are likely to vanish afterwards, independently
of the input x. While such permutations are straightforward
to find, this malicious tampering is hard to detect because
the resulting weight matrices might actually have occurred
by chance, even if the respective probability is small. An
estimation of this probability is given in (4), after the attack
has been explained.
The attack works by making large parts of the network
effectively useless by canceling out the respective components
with zero factors. The gradient based training methods struggle
to recover from such configurations because many of the
parameters are no longer updated at all.
The method is supposed to work without any knowledge of
the training dataset, but we will assume that the components of
x are positive. This corresponds to the standard normalization
of the input data between 0 and 1. For input vectors x
that result from the application of previous layers it is often
reasonable to expect an approximately normal distribution
with the same characteristics for all components of x. This
assumption is (particularly) valid for wide previous layers
with randomly distributed weights because the sum of many
independent random variables is an approximately normally
distributed random variable due to the central limit theorem
[30].
The idea behind our approach to make many components of
y vanish is best illustrated by means of the sketches (2) and
4The formulation for a row vector is slightly different, however completely
analogous.
(3). The components of the matrices and vectors are depicted
as little squares. Darker colors mean larger values. In addition,
hatched squares indicate components with a high probability
of being zero.
In matrix A, the largest components of the original matrix
are all randomly distributed in the lower (1−rA)m rows. The
small and often negative components are randomly distributed
in the upper rAm rows, so that products of these rows with
the positive x are likely negative. rA ∈ { 1m , 2m , ..., 1} controls
the fraction of rows that are filled with the “small” values. If
the bias a is not too large, the resulting vector will have many
zeros in the upper rows due to the ReLU-cutoff.
ReLU



︸ ︷︷ ︸
matrix A


︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
+a

=

 (2)
Next, a similar approach can be used with matrix B to
eliminate the remaining positive components. Let rB control
the fraction of “small” columns of B.
ReLU



︸ ︷︷ ︸
matrix B

+ b

=


︸ ︷︷ ︸
y
(3)
In summary, we concentrate the positive contributions in
a few places and “cross” A and B in order to annihilate
them. For the typical case of weights drawn from a zero mean
distribution, rA = rB = 12 effectively kills all the neurons and
makes training impossible.
The probability for obtaining a matrix like A in (2) by
chance is
(rAmn)!
(
(1− rA)mn
)
!
(mn)!
, (4)
which is the number of permutations of the small components
times the number of permutations of the large components,
divided by the number of permutations of all the components.
Even for intermediate values of m and n this number is very
small due to the rapid super-exponential growth of the faculty.
B. Detailed Description of Attacks
With the general idea of our attack in mind, we can now
discuss specifics. A complete blockade of the entire network
obviously contradicts the idea of stealthiness because at least
some learning is expected by the user. The prototypical attack
must thus be “weakened” in a controlled manner to comply
with the specification. Towards this end we introduce specific
implementations of the idea that can actually be used in
practice. Finally we discuss the special case of convolutional
layers. The effect of the attacks is analyzed in the next section.
1) Soft Knockout Attack: The first way of controlling the
network capacity is by varying rA and rB in such a way
that some but not all of the neurons have some non-vanishing
probability of being non-zero. This is achieved by choosing
rA <
1
2 or rB <
1
2 respectively rA  12 or rB  12 .
We formalize this approach in algorithm 1 for fully con-
nected layers. The attacker only alters one weight matrix at
a time, in the order one would initialize the weights in the
model.
To perturb a weight matrix, we first obtain the (100× r)%
smallest weights, denoted as S (line 3). We denote the re-
maining, larger weights as L (line 4). Depending on the status
of the variable cross which is flipped each round (line 10),
we reorder the weights. For the first and all unevenly indexed
matrices, we align the small weights in the upper rows and
then fill up with the larger weights (line 8). For all evenly
indexed matrices, we cross the components: The first columns
contain the large weights, and we fill up with the small weights
(line 6). In this formalization, we skip the details of the exact
reshaping operations needed to obtain matrices of the correct
shape. We also skip that columns and rows might be filled
partially with small and large weights.
Algorithm 1 Soft Knockout. Given a stream of weightsW =
{W1, ...} and parameter r ∈ [0, 1], output permuted weights
that will impede training.
Require: W , r
1: cross ← False
2: for Wi ∈ W do
3: S← smallest r|Wi| components of Wi
4: L← largest (1− r)|Wi| components of Wi
5: if cross then:
6: Wi ←
(
L S
)
7: else
8: Wi ←
(
S
L
)
9: end if
10: cross ← ¬ cross
11: end for
2) Shift Attack: The previously defined method of softening
the neuron cancellation has some drawbacks that will be dis-
cussed below. As an alternative, we can choose rA = rB = 12
and shift the columns of B periodically by s positions. In a
fully connected network, this corresponds to s active neurons.
Hence, we obtain good control over the final capacity of the
network. We formalize this attack in algorithm 2.
In contrast to the previous attack, we now split the weight
matrix in negative (line 3) and non-negative (line 4) com-
ponents. As before, further computations depend on the cross
variable which is flipped each iteration (line 11). For unevenly
indexed matrices, we fill the first rows with the negative
Algorithm 2 Shift Attack. Given a stream of weights of fully
connected layers W = {W1, ...} and shift parameter s ∈ N,
output permuted weights that will impede training.
Require: W , s
1: cross ← False
2: for Wi ∈ W do
3: S← negative components of Wi
4: L← non-negative components of Wi
5: if cross then:
6: Wi ←
(
L S
)
7: shift columns of Wi by s positions periodically
8: else
9: Wi ←
(
S
L
)
10: end if
11: cross ← ¬ cross
12: end for
input
4 filters
intermediate
layer 4 filters with 4 channels
+ + + +
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output
Fig. 4: Sketch of our attack on convolutional layers. See
section V-B3 for a description. The color scheme is the same
as that in (2) and (3). For a general illustration of the workings
of filters, cf. section IV and in particular fig. 3.
components and then fill up with the non-negative weights
(line 9). The crossing case differs from the previous algorithm:
we first take the same step of filling column wise starting with
the large components (line 6). Then, we shift the rows by s
positions to activate s neurons (line 7). As before, we skip
details of reshaping and mixed rows and columns.
3) Convolutional Layers: Particular care has to be taken
when attacking convolutional networks. Yet, the idea of weight
permutation and matrix crossing works in a very similar way.
We formalize the attacks for convolutional weights represented
as 4-dimensional tensors: filter height × filter width × number
channels × number filters. This requires a different sorting of
the components than for fully connected layers. The procedure
is illustrated for two consecutive convolutional layers with a
one-channel 4 × 4 input and a four-channel 4 × 4 output in
fig. 4. The smallest weights are randomly distributed over the
−3
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Fig. 5: Mean and variance of the weights in the “small values”
respectively “large values” blocks of A.
first half of the filters, resulting in a very likely deactivation of
half the channels after the application of the ReLU activation
function. For each filter of the second layer, half the channels
are equipped with the small weights, so that the negative
filter channels are applied to the positive input channels. The
positive filter weights are applied to the deactivated neurons,
so that they do not contribute to the sum over all channels
for each filter. This results in the probable deactivation of all
output channels.
Given this layout, we can shift the channels of a filter of the
second layer in order to not block the whole network, which
was previously pointed out as a requirement for stealthiness.
Compared to the previously discussed shifting attack we have
more degrees of freedom because we can decide on a shift
on a per filter basis and we can choose the number of filters
where we want to apply shifting. The same can also is also
implemented for the soft knockout attack, where we also
specify on how many filters in the even layers the permutation
is applied.
C. Statistical Analysis of Attacks
In order to establish that the idea presented in section V-A
actually does what it is supposed to do, we proceed with a
formal analysis of the statistics of the attacks. The goal is
to give estimates of the probabilities of deactivating certain
neurons by means of adversarial initialization in the above
sense. We investigate how the layer size, the variance of the
weights and the magnitude of the biases influence our attack
and show that the input data is indeed not important for its
success. For clarity, we only consider the case of two fully
connected layers as presented as the prototype of our attack
in section V-A. Yet, the analysis basically carries over to
convolutions, the shifting and the soft knockout attack because
the corresponding parameters can be adapted to all cases.
1) Statistics of the Modified Matrices: As groundwork for
the subsequent discussion, we first look at the statistics of
the components of the block matrices A in (2), where the
randomly sampled components are split into two sets of large
respectively small values. In particular, we are interested in the
mean values µA,S and µA,L as well as the variances σ2A,S and
σ2A,L of the components of the two blocks of A, depending
on the parameter rA that determines the size of the split. The
subscript A denotes matrix A, so that we can distinguish the
values from those for B (from (3)) for which the respective
values can be calculated in a completely analogous way. The
quantities that refer to the block of small values have the
subscript S and the respective quantities for the block of large
values are sub-scripted with L, consistent with the notation in
algorithm 1 and algorithm 2. We will later need the means
and variances for estimating the probability of knocking out
neurons.
We focus on the most relevant case of components that are
drawn from a normal distribution with mean µA and variance
σ2A, now without the subscripts S or L because we refer to the
unsplit values. The distribution of the weights in the “small
values” block of A can then be approximated as a normal
distribution that is cut off (i.e. zero for all values greater than
some c) depending on the parameter rA in such a way that the
respective part of the original distribution covers the fraction
rA of the overall probability mass. Formalizing this, the value
of the cut-off-parameter c is obtained by solving the equation
rA =
∫ c
−∞
1√
2piσA
exp
(
− z
2
2σ2A
)
dz (5)
for c. We obtain c =
√
2σA erf
−1(2rA − 1), where erf−1 is
the inverse error function. As a result, we get the following
probability density distribution for the weights of the “small
values” block of A:
fA,S(z) =
{
1√
2piσArA
exp
(
− z2
2σ2A
)
for z < c,
0 else.
(6)
The density fA,L for the “large values” block is found accord-
ingly.
Before proceeding, we introduce the shorthand notation
g(r) :=
√
pi exp
((
erf−1(2r − 1))2) , (7)
which will proof useful for presenting the results in a more
succinct form. From (6) a straightforward integration yields
µA,S = − σA√
2rAg(rA)
, (8a)
µA,L =
σA√
2(1− rA)g(rA)
. (8b)
Likewise, the variances of the components of the two blocks
are:
σ2A,S = σ
2
A +
√
2σA erf
−1(2rA − 1)µA,S − µ2A,S (9a)
σ2A,L = σ
2
A +
√
2σA erf
−1(2rA − 1)µA,L − µ2A,L (9b)
The means and variances are plotted in fig. 5. In our model,
µA,S is always negative while µA,L is always positive because
there is always an imbalance between positive and negative
values. Large or small values of rA make the statistics of the
larger block look like those of the original matrix A, while the
few values in the small block have a mean with large absolute
value and small variance.
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Fig. 6: Illustration of the probability of obtaining deactivated neurons after the first layer, depending on the relative block size
rA and selected values for the other parameters.
2) First Layer: With these results in mind, we are ready
to analyze the effect of the first layer of (1) with a weight
matrix A that is split according to (2) and a bias a. With the
convenient definition
h = Ax+ a (10)
we can estimate the expected value E[hi] of the components of
h given random inputs and fixed weights and biases. We define
a shorthand notation for the expected values µx := E[xi] (for
any i, see below) as well as µA,i := E[Ai:] and get:
µh,i := E[hi] =
n∑
j=1
Aij E[xj ] + ai
≈ nµx 1
n
n∑
j=1
Aij + ai ≈ nµxµA,i
(11)
The first approximation is based on the premise that the
components of x are approximately equally distributed while
the second approximation gets better with increasing n. Under
the same assumptions and with the variance σ2A,i of the
elements of the i-th row of A as well as the variance σ2x
of the components of x, together with the premise that the
components of A and those of x are statistically independent,
we obtain:
E[h2i ] ≈ E[x]2n(n− 1)µ2A,i + 2ainE[x] E[Ai:]
+ E[x2]n
(
σ2A,i + µ
2
A,i
)
+ a2i
(12)
With that, we get the variance of hi:
σ2h,i := E[h
2
i ]− E[hi]2 ≈ n
(
µ2A,iσ
2
x + σ
2
A,iσ
2
x + σ
2
A,iµ
2
x
)
(13)
As we assume n to be large enough for our approximations
to be reasonable, we can apply the central limit theorem that
tells us that hi will approximately follow a normal distribution
N (µh,i, σ2h,i). Because of this, (11) and (13) completely
determine the distribution of hi and the probability for hi to
be smaller than or equal to zero is readily estimated as
P[hi ≤ 0] =
∫ 0
−∞
N (h;µh,i, σ2h,i)dh =
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
µh,i
σh,i
√
2
)
.
(14)
For normally distributed weights, (11) and (13) can be
calculated on the basis of our previous results for the statistics
of A, given in (8) and (9). Under our assumptions, the row
index i matters only in so far that it either belongs to the
(hopefully) deactivated neurons or to the other block. We
obtain:
µh,S
σh,S
√
2
=
√
2
n
(
ai
σAµx
)
rAg(rA)−
√
n
4√(
r2Ag(rA)
2 − rA erf−1(2rA − 1)g(rA)
) ( σ2x
µ2x
+ 1
)
− 1
2
.
(15a)
The corresponding expression for µh,L
σh,L
√
2
is
√
2
n
(
ai
σAµx
)
(1− rA)g(rA) +
√
n
4√(
(1− rA)2g(rA)2 + (1− rA) erf−1(2rA − 1)g(rA)
)( σ2x
µ2x
+ 1
)
− 1
2
.
(15b)
Together with (14) we obtain estimations for the prob-
abilities of switching off neurons after the first layer. The
behavior depends on three dimensionless5 parameters that are
given due to the setup: The input dimension n, the ratio
ai
σAµx
that corresponds to the relative importance of the bias
and σ
2
x
µ2x
, which can roughly be described as a measure of
sharpness of the input distribution. The influence of these
parameters can be observed in fig. 6. As expected, a significant
positive bias deteriorates the probability; nevertheless it must
be unusually high for having a significant effect. For large n,
5This concept of “dimensionless” stems from physics and related disci-
plines, where similar quantities are used to describe and classify complex
systems in a unit-independent way.
the probabilities are more distinct because the statistics get
sharper. The characteristics of the input data, on the other
hand, do not play a big role, as it can be seen in the second
diagram. Note that the variance of the weights does not directly
influence the probabilities. Overall we can conclude that the
chances of deactivating neurons is indeed high for realistic
choices of parameters and that the characteristics of the input
data hardly influence the system.
3) Second Layer: In a next step, we could analyze the
effect of the second layer in a similar way: Large parts of
the computation can directly be transferred and the main
difference is a rise in technical complexity of the formulae
without a gain of understanding, so we leave out the details
from the paper.
D. Small Networks
Taking into account our previous analysis and the depen-
dence on the layer size, we see that small networks (in our
case the networks trained on credit and spam data, see below)
are not very susceptible to the attacks that were discussed so
far. Their weight matrices are so small that the statistics are
not sharp enough for guaranteeing deactivated neurons with a
high enough probability, rendering the overall scheme useless.
However, those networks can be targeted as well. We for-
mulate the following general knockout optimization problem,
where our network F is parametrized with the weight matrices
Wi:
min
{Wi}
∑
c
∑
j
Fc(Xj)
 , s.t. ‖Wi‖F = const. (16)
This expression describes a minimization of the output
of the last layer for each class c. The constraint keeps the
Frobenius norm of the weights constant so that they usually
tend to stay close to the original weights, making the attack
stealthy. While this problem is formulated in a way that
requires full knowledge of the network and the data, we can
obtain reasonable results on a batch of data drawn from a
uniform distribution and replacing later parts of the network
with randomly drawn fresh matrices.
We mention this attack for the sake of completeness. In
practice, small networks are not as relevant as the large ones,
so that a failure on them is not problematic. As a side note,
this alternative approach underlines the point that our attacks
are merely specific instances of a larger class of attacks with
the goal of deteriorating DNN performance.
VI. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
We now evaluate the previously derived attacks. Before we
present our results, we detail the setting, describe the datasets
and architectures we use and explain how we illustrate our
findings.
A. Experimental Setup
Datasets. We evaluate the attacks on a range of datasets,
which are summarized in table I. We choose two small
datasets, spam [20] and credit [20]. The spam dataset defines
a binary classification task. Based on 56 binary or real valued
features, emails are to be classified as “ham” or “spam”.
Credit contains 14 features and 690 instances, and our task
is to predict whether an applicant is granted a credit demand.
We furthermore consider classification tasks on middle-sized
datasets, MNIST [18] and the more challenging Fashion-
MNIST [39]. Both consist of black and white pictures of size
28 × 28 pixels. The former dataset contains the handwritten
digits 0-9, the latter images of clothing such as shoes, hats, or
trousers. Finally and as a more challenging task, we choose
the classification of images from the CIFAR10 [17] dataset.
This dataset consists of small, colored images (sized 32× 32
pixels) of trucks, cars, planes etc.
TABLE I: Overview of datasets used.
Name number of number of random kind of assigned
features samples guess features color
Credit 14 690 60% mixed purple
Spam 56 4 601 70% mixed blue
MNIST 28×28×1 70 000 10% real green
F-MNIST 28×28×1 70 000 10% real yellow
CIFAR10 32×32×3 60 000 10% real orange
Architectures. We evaluate two different kinds of architec-
tures, fully connected networks and convolutional networks.
All our fully connected networks contain n/2 neurons in the
first hidden layer, where n is the number of features. The
second hidden layer is of the same size as the first for Spam
and Credit, and has 49 neurons for the two MNIST tasks. As
an example for a convolutional architecture, we use LeNet on
CIFAR10 [19].
The fully connected networks are trained for 300 epochs
on both MNIST variants and for 3000 epochs on the small
datasets. LeNet is trained for 200 epochs. We initialize all
networks using the He initializer and optimize them with the
Adam optimizer with its default learning rate of 0.001. We
show in appendix B that the initializer and optimizer do not
affect our results.
Presentation of results. We are interested in how our
attacks affect the probability to get a well performing network
after training. Towards this end, we mainly consider two
quantities: The best accuracy that is reached during training
and the epoch in which it has been reached. Due to the random
initialization and the way in which neural networks work, there
is not a single best accuracy and a particular best epoch for a
given task, but a distribution over accuracies and epochs. We
approximate these distributions by evaluating a sample of 50
networks with different seeds for the random initializer6. We
then plot the smoothed probability density function over the
best test accuracies during training and the epochs at which
this accuracy was observed. While we use Gaussian kernel
density estimation for the former, the latter is depicted using
6We keep the same 50 seeds fixed over all experiments for comparability.
However, due to effects from parallelization on GPUs, e.g. the accuracy might
differ by up to 2% for seemingly identical setups.
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Fig. 7: Soft knockout attack using r = 0.45 on Credit (above)
and Spam (below) datasets.
histograms. Both distributions are compared to a baseline,
which is derived from a sample of 50 networks with the same
random seeds, trained without any tampering.
B. Soft Knockout Attack
For the soft knockout attack (cf. section V-B1), we control
the size of the split of the small and large values of the
weight matrices in order to not knock out all the neurons at
once. The experiments show that this gives little control over
the performance of a network: On fully connected networks,
training either fails entirely, or the network achieves normal
accuracy (however after a larger number of epochs). These
results might be interpreted in the following way: As soon as
the networks have some non-vanishing chance of updating the
weights (which is the idea of soft knockout), they can recover
from the bad initialization.
We first present the results on small networks (in our case
for the Credit and Spam tasks) in fig. 7. Even with r = 0.45 we
observe little effect. For the credit data we find some networks
with decreased accuracy. In general, however, the accuracy
remains similar and even improves in some cases on the spam
data. The training time does increase on average, however.
As an example for larger fully connected architectures, we
plot the results on Fashion-MNIST in fig. 8. We depict the
results for r = 0.2 and r = 0.25. A parameter r > 0.3 leads
to complete failure to learn: all accuracies are equivalent to
guessing. We observe that networks that perform as good as
random guess usually perform best in their first iteration, and
do not improve during training or more concretely, they do not
train at all. This is visible as well for r = 0.25 and hence in the
upper plot of fig. 8. We picked Fashion-MNIST to illustrate
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Fig. 8: The soft knockout attack allows little control over the
networks accuracy: Fashion-MNIST, fully connected network,
r = 0.25 (above) versus r = 0.2 (below). The networks either
fail entirely or converge normally (albeit slower).
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Fig. 9: The soft knockout attack on convolutional nets applies
r = 0.2 to every second layer on the CIFAR10 dataset. The
upper plot corresponds to an attack with softening of one filter,
the one below to a soft attack on 16 filters.
this, although it occurs in general. For slightly lower r = 0.2,
however, most seeds achieve baseline accuracy. Once again
the training time is increased on average, as visible in fig. 8.
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Fig. 10: Using off-the-shelf optimization to knock out neurons
on the credit (above) and spam (below) tasks.
We finally apply an adapted version of the soft knockout
attack to a convolutional network on CIFAR10. The results
are presented in fig. 9. We set in every second (uneven) layer
to r = 0.2, otherwise to 0.5 We compare between applying
softening to only one filter or to sixteen filters (the latter means
half of the available filters). In contrast to the results for fully
connected networks, we do observe a reasonable decrease in
the best achieved accuracy. This accuracy is typically reached
at the beginning of the training, which means that the networks
actually get worse during training instead of converging to a
good configuration.
C. Optimization Based Knockout Attack
As we have seen in the previous section, we cannot harm
small networks using the previously introduced soft knockout
attack. Hence, we introduce the generic optimization based
attack for small networks in section V-D. We implemented this
attack using an off-the-shelf optimizer provided by Scipy [15]
and present the respective experimental results.
The optimization finishes quickly for our small networks
(with a runtime below one second). We depict the resulting
accuracy distributions in fig. 10. Independent of the dataset,
networks either fail completely (best accuracy in iteration 0),
or they converge to the original accuracy (however slower).
We conclude that small networks can be targeted, albeit it is
hard to decrease accuracy in a stealthy way.
D. Shift Attack
The shift attack (cf. section V-B2) gives more fine-grained
control over the network that the victim trains. For fully
connected networks, the shift parameter is equivalent to the
number of active neurons in the network. We depict our results
with a shift parameter of 4 and 8 on MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST in fig. 11. Both decrease the accuracy significantly
but without making the network fail completely.
As expected, as the shift decreases and less neurons are
available to the network, the networks’ performance decreases
as well. On Fashion-MNIST, we observe an increase in train-
ing time of around 50 epochs. This is less clear for MNIST,
where several networks are failing, and achieve their best
(random guess) accuracy in epoch one. We observe that on
these two datasets, a shift parameter greater than 12 does not
decrease the accuracy. For smaller shifts, the networks obtain
a lower accuracy after the same or a longer training time.
We additionally depict the results on convolutional networks
on the CIFAR10 dataset in fig. 12. We once again apply a shift
of either four or eight and set the number of filters this shift is
applied to to either one or sixteen. As for the fully connected
networks, we observe a strong decrease in accuracy.
We observe that most networks fail for a shift of four,
independently of the number of filters that are affected. With a
shift of eight, the networks obtain an average accuracy around
43% if one filter is affected and around 50% if the number
of filters is increased to 16. In contrast to the previous attacks
on dense networks, we mostly observe a decrease in training
time. An exception to this is a shift of four applied to sixteen
filters, where the training time is either very short or rather
long.
E. Conclusion on Attacks
To conclude the section, we first want to discuss the
parameter choices of the attacker. As we have seen, small shifts
and intermediate values of r ruin learning entirely, whereas
large shifts or extreme values of r often delay learning or
have no effect. In accordance with what could be expected, we
further observe that a task like CIFAR10 needs more active
neurons than for example MNIST. This is a potential problem
for our attack because the number of deactivated neurons has
to be adapted in order the both stealthy and effective. Yet,
the victim gives us some knowledge about the difficulty of
the task when she initializes the network: A fully connected
network for Spam is much smaller than one for MNIST.
The attacker could thus apply a simple rule that activates an
appropriate fraction of connections. Even if the victim enlarges
the network and finally succeeds, the attacker still achieves her
goal: The network is unnecessarily large and thus needs more
time to train.
All in all, we conclude that it is indeed possible to harm a
network by changing the initialization with relatively straight-
forward attacks, even if no knowledge about the data or task is
available. At the same time, our evaluation shows that network
convergence is sometimes bad even for the natural, untampered
initializations. The baselines in fig. 11 on MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST are an example, where some untampered networks
only achieve 60% or 80% accuracy. This might imply the
existence of more stealthy attacks. More research is needed
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(a) Shift set to 4.
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(b) Shift set to 8.
Fig. 11: The shift attack on the MNIST (above) and Fashion-MNIST (below) tasks.
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(a) Shift applied to one filter.
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(b) Shift applied to sixteen filters.
Fig. 12: The shift attack on convolutional architectures. We vary both the shift (upper plots’ shift is four, lower plots’ shift is
eight) and the number of filters the shift is applied to (left and right plots). Evaluation dataset is CIFAR10.
to gather knowledge about symptoms and defenses in these
cases.
VII. DEFENDING INITIALIZATION ATTACKS
In this section, we want to discuss defenses against the
previously introduced and evaluated, harmful attacks. We start
with a comment on algorithms that are by their nature immune
to our attacks and then dive into direct defenses applicable
when no other algorithm can be used.
Algorithms like support vector machines or one layer neural
networks (logistic regression) are based on a convex opti-
mization problem. They are hence not as vulnerable to a bad
initialization as deep neural networks. Yet, algorithms such
as support vector machines tend to not scale well to large
amounts of data [4]. In addition, deep learning is particularly
well suited to perform certain tasks like image classification
and is currently state of the art for many tasks [13]. Due to
that, switching to other algorithms is usually not an option.
However, if deep learning is applied, we need to make sure
that malicious initializations do not occur.
The typical diagnostics are not enough for that. During
training, developers typically monitor the loss and some
statistics of the network, as for example the distribution of
the weights. By definition, the latter is not changed by our
attacks. The loss, on the other hand, looks unsuspicious as
well because the network is still trained in the regular way,
just with a reduced capacity. An example is shown in fig. 13.
The curves are clearly different but they might both be the
result of an untampered learning process. The victim might
conclude that the learning rate is too small or that the network
is not expressive enough but all that will of course not fix the
underlying problem of an artificially reduced capacity of the
network.
Beyond the standard diagnostics, the resorting is clearly
visible to the victim if the weight matrices are plotted, as
we show in fig. 14. Yet, the full weight matrices are typically
not monitored, as they are assumed to be random anyway
and as dumps of all the weights can quickly become very
storage intensive due to the size of modern neural networks.
Analogously, our attack on convolutional networks can be
discovered by visualizing the filters that were learned, as it
is shown in fig. 15.
Last but nor least, an indirect defense to this kind of attacks
is provided by well tested datasets such as MNIST, where
achievable accuracies are documented: A decrease in accuracy
will quickly be noticed in this context. This might lead to an
arms-race, though, when the attacker does not target a network
that fits the structure of these datasets.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented a new threat model for deep
learning models that we call adversarial initialization. We
showed how an attacker can exploit the lack of understanding
and the typical practices of deep learning: A mere permu-
tation of any randomly chosen initial weights is sufficient
to decrease accuracy or increase training time significantly
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Fig. 13: Visualization of the loss over time during training. We
apply the shift attack with shift 8 to a fully connected network
and train on Fashion MNIST. We show both the training loss
(left) and the test loss (right).
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Fig. 15: Comparison of the convolutional filter output for one
sample on a untouched (above) and a network initialized by
an adversary (below). Filters with zero output are hatched.
without altering any of the typical diagnostics in a way that
would invoke suspicions. We complemented our empirical
study with a formal analysis which backs up our findings.
Our results further hint towards the existence of even more
stealthy attacks: More research is needed to identify, asses and
mitigate these. For the attacks in this work, however, defenses
are straight forward: plotting weight matrices or visualizing
the learned convolutional filters suffices to detect an attacker.
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APPENDIX
A. Evaluation on Alternative Attacks.
We described some attacks that might be alternatives to
ours in section V and concluded that they would not work
very well in practice due to aspects beyond their effect in a
controlled setting. For the sake of completeness, we present the
evaluation of some of these alternative attacks in this section.
This evaluation follows the set up described in section VI-A.
The results presented here can be compared against those for
our main attacks.
For the first attack we change the variance of the weights:
instead of offsetting it to the ideal value 2/fanin, we set it to
2/fanout. We report the results of our experiment on the Credit
and Spam tasks in fig. 16. We observe an increase in training
time, and an increase of non-converging networks on the credit
data. The accuracy on the spam data does not change.
In a second experiment, we alter the leaning rate maliciously
to slow down learning. Instead of the default 10−3, we set the
learning rate to 10−6 and depict the results in fig. 17. We
observe both intended effects, as the training time increases
and the accuracies decrease.
Finally, we consider the effect of choosing a very large
dropout probability during training. We evaluate this on Spam
(dropout rate 0.005) and MNIST (dropout rate 0.01). We depict
the results of our experiments in fig. 18. We again observe both
desired properties: an increase in training time and a decrease
in accuracy.
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Fig. 16: Setting variance to non-ideal value on the credit
(above) and the spam (below) task.
B. Evaluation with SGD and Glorot Initializer.
In the main evaluation, we focus on He initialization and the
Adam optimizer. In this appendix, we add additional results
using the Glorot initializer and the SGD optimizer to show
that the difference in vulnerability is negligible. We again
follow the set up described in section VI-A. We start with the
effect of the shift attack on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST using
the Glorot initializer in fig. 19. He performs better than the
Glorot initializer under and without the attack. Additionally,
we compare SGD and Adam optimizer on the optimization
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Fig. 17: Maliciously set learning rate on credit (above) and
MNIST (below) task.
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Fig. 18: Maliciously set dropout (attack) and benign training
(baseline) on spam (above) and MNIST (below).
attack in fig. 20. Adam converges earlier on both datasets and
yields higher accuracy both without and under attack. All in
all the results indeed show that the attack does not hinge on
a particular initializer.
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(a) Glorot initializer.
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(b) He initializer.
Fig. 19: The influence of the initializer on vulnerability to the shift attack. Datasets are MNIST (above) and Fashion-MNIST
(below), shift is set to 8.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
de
ns
ity
best accuracy
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
0 1000 2000 3000
nu
m
be
r
of
ca
se
s
best epoch
baseline
attack
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
de
ns
ity
best accuracy
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0 1000 2000 3000
nu
m
be
r
of
ca
se
s
best epoch
baseline
attack
(a) SGD optimizer.
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(b) Adam optimizer.
Fig. 20: The influence of the optimizer on vulnerability to the optimization attack. Datasets are credit (above) and spam (below).
